Job Market Paper
The Global Arms Supply Constraint and Its Implications for Modern Conflicts
Abstract
Modern International Relations theories of conflict largely relies on rationality-based arguments to explain the variance in interstate armed conflict. In this paper, I introduce an alternate logic, that of a global arms production constraint, to explain why conflicts between states of disparate military strengths are more likely to engage in militarized conflict in the post-World War II era. I argue that due to the increased complexity and specialization of production, the manufacture and supply of modern arms globally is highly concentrated and constrained. This creates a unique security environment where the difficulty in sustaining arms supply necessary for militarized conflict leads states to fight shorter conflicts with predictable outcomes, so as to minimize their need for arms. My results show that in the post-WWII period, states of disparate military strengths are 36.8% more likely to engage in militarized conflict. This paper also makes a methodological contribution by introducing a new measurement of military strength using a two-step Principal Component Analysis – Manhattan Distance (PCA-MD) technique and k-Means Clustering on comprehensive arsenal data from 1970 – 2014 to better reflect the effectiveness of combined arms capabilities in modern warfare. Compared to existing measures of military strength, this measurement is demonstrated to be more robust and accurate in reflecting modern military capabilities.
Working Papers
On the Relationship between Arms Supply and War
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between arms supply and war. I argue that the availability of third-party arms supply determines the probability, timing, and intensity of most interstate wars in the post-WWII world. The flow of arms supply is determined not only by the production capability and strategic calculations of the suppliers, but also existing supplier networks and military capability of the potential belligerent. Given that the global supply of arms does not vary with demand driven by conflict, belligerents supported by Great Power suppliers are more likely to engage in militarized conflicts. Moreover, decisions made by suppliers to limit or increase arms transfers could significantly affect the development of the conflict. I apply this theoretical framework to analyze the Iran-Iraq War of 1980. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, I demonstrate that despite the belligerent’s relative financial independence, third-party arms suppliers played a crucial role in various stages and aspects of the conflict.
Measuring Military Capability: Introducing an Integrated Dimensional Clustering Approach
Abstract
How should military capability be defined? Past theories on power perception and international order offer contradicting analysis, empirical validity, and generalization for the same observations. This paper provides a novel two-dimensional framework for understanding military capabilities: strength and growth. I theorize that states on similar strength levels tend to cooperate with each other, while states on similar growth levels will engage in more conflict. Furthermore, I propose a new measurement of military capability on these two dimensions using k-means clustering machine learning model and principal component analysis. Lastly, I employ logit regression to demonstrate that states in the same growth cluster are more likely to engage in conflict while states in the same strength cluster experience the opposite.
The Unfolding Character of Balancing in International Relations: The Case of Middle Powers Responding to China’s Rise (with Arthur Stein)
Abstract
This paper criticizes the conventional balance-of-power argument of a dichotomy between balancing and bandwagoning in response to adverse shifts in the balance. It delineates the assumptions underlying balancing arguments and problems associated with them. It argues that bandwagoning and balancing constitute ends of a continuum of state responses, and that each also consists of multiple possibilities. And it argues that there is a process by which rising powers manifest threat. Similarly, there is a historical unfolding process in state responses to growing threats. The paper draws on a variety of data sources to demonstrate the delayed and limited military assertiveness of China, and the range of responses by the regional powers threatened by China’s maritime claims. China’s assertiveness has both brought together the spokes in the US security structure in Asia, but has also led to hedging by those without allies.