Job Market Paper
The Global Arms Supply Constraint and Its Implications for Modern Conflicts
Abstract
Scholars of conflict have long researched the declining occurrence of militarized international conflicts in the modern world. In this paper, I introduce a constraining framework to explain why modern conflicts are tempered by the means of war, rather than the logic of war. I argue that due to the increased complexity and specialization of arms production, the manufacture and supply of modern arms globally is highly concentrated and constrained. This creates a unique security environment where the difficulty in sustaining arms supply necessary for militarized conflict leads states to prefer shorter conflicts with more predictable outcomes, so as to decrease the level of uncertainty in their arms supply. My results show that in constrast with the pre-WWII period, in the post-WWII era, states of disparate military strengths are more likely to engage in militarized conflict. Moreover, conflicts are more likely to occur when the initiator is relatively confident in the stability of their arms supply. This paper also makes a methodological contribution by introducing a new measurement of military strength using a two-step Principal Component Analysis – Manhattan Distance (PCA-MD) technique on comprehensive arsenal data from 1970 – 2023 to better reflect the effectiveness of combined arms capabilities in modern warfare. Compared to existing measures of military strength, this measurement is demonstrated to be more robust and accurate in reflecting modern military capabilities.
Working Papers
On the Relationship between Arms Supply and War
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between arms supply and war. I argue that the availability of third-party arms supply determines the probability, timing, and intensity of most interstate wars in the post-WWII world. The flow of arms supply is determined not only by the production capability and strategic calculations of the suppliers, but also existing supplier networks and military capability of the potential belligerent. Given that the global supply of arms does not vary with demand driven by conflict, belligerents supported by Great Power suppliers are more likely to engage in militarized conflicts. Moreover, decisions made by suppliers to limit or increase arms transfers could significantly affect the development of the conflict. I apply this theoretical framework to analyze the Iran-Iraq War of 1980. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, I demonstrate that despite the belligerent’s relative financial independence, third-party arms suppliers played a crucial role in various stages and aspects of the conflict.
Theorizing the Fundamentals of Arms Diplomacy
Abstract
When and why do states use arms diplomacy? In this paper, I argue that arms transfer is a diplomatic tool primarily used for two strategic objectives: alliance capability enhancement and power projection. However, the availability of alternative
suppliers and the supplier state’s financial incentives to export arms mitigate the effectiveness of arms diplomacy. I use the logit regression to examine whether arms diplomacy is used for achieving foreign policy goals and how successful they are likely to be. My results show that arms diplomacy is a common diplomatic tool employed by the United States to encourage the establishment of overseas military bases and project military power beyond its borders. Furthermore, weapons that tend to attract more media and public attention are more likely to be used for diplomatic purposes than others, indicating that the selection of arms transferred is strategic.
Measuring Military Capability: Introducing an Integrated Dimensional Clustering Approach
Abstract
How should military capability be defined? Past theories on power perception and international order offer contradicting analysis, empirical validity, and generalization for the same observations. This paper provides a novel two-dimensional framework for understanding military capabilities: strength and growth. I theorize that states on similar strength levels tend to cooperate with each other, while states on similar growth levels will engage in more conflict. Furthermore, I propose a new measurement of military capability on these two dimensions using k-means clustering machine learning model and principal component analysis. Lastly, I employ logit regression to demonstrate that states in the same growth cluster are more likely to engage in conflict while states in the same strength cluster experience the opposite.
The Unfolding Character of Balancing in International Relations: The Case of Middle Powers Responding to China’s Rise (with Arthur Stein)
Abstract
This paper criticizes the conventional balance-of-power argument of a dichotomy between balancing and bandwagoning in response to adverse shifts in the balance. It delineates the assumptions underlying balancing arguments and problems associated with them. It argues that bandwagoning and balancing constitute ends of a continuum of state responses, and that each also consists of multiple possibilities. And it argues that there is a process by which rising powers manifest threat. Similarly, there is a historical unfolding process in state responses to growing threats. The paper draws on a variety of data sources to demonstrate the delayed and limited military assertiveness of China, and the range of responses by the regional powers threatened by China’s maritime claims. China’s assertiveness has both brought together the spokes in the US security structure in Asia, but has also led to hedging by those without allies.