Working Papers
On the Relationship between Arms Supply and War
Abstract
How does the global supply of arms influence modern war? In this paper, I advance a theory of modern war that centers on the availability of arms supply as a primary determinant of militarized conflict in the post-WWII era. I argue that two characteristics of the global arms industry—oligopoly and supply inelasticity—constrain both the occurrence and intensity of militarized conflicts. This theory models global arms transfers during wartime as a strategic allocation problem for the few major arms suppliers and draws several important implications for understanding modern militarized conflict. First, belligerents supported by Great Power suppliers prior to conflict are more likely to engage in militarized conflicts, though they are also in turn constrained by their supplier's continued patronage. Second, the decisions by suppliers to limit or alter the quantity and type of arms transferred can significantly influence the trajectory of a conflict. Lastly, the limited production capacity of the global arms industry and stockpile dynamics serve as a form of universal constraint on the number and intensity of large-scale militarized interstate conflicts that can occur concurrently.
Theorizing the Fundamentals of Arms Diplomacy
Abstract
When and why do states use arms diplomacy? In this paper, I argue that arms transfer is a diplomatic tool primarily used for two strategic objectives: alliance capability enhancement and power projection. However, the availability of alternative
suppliers and the supplier state’s financial incentives to export arms mitigate the effectiveness of arms diplomacy. I use the logit regression to examine whether arms diplomacy is used for achieving foreign policy goals and how successful they are likely to be. My results show that arms diplomacy is a common diplomatic tool employed by the United States to encourage the establishment of overseas military bases and project military power beyond its borders. Furthermore, weapons that tend to attract more media and public attention are more likely to be used for diplomatic purposes than others, indicating that the selection of arms transferred is strategic.
Measuring Military Capability: Introducing an Integrated Dimensional Clustering Approach
Abstract
How should military capability be defined? Past theories on power perception and international order offer contradicting analysis, empirical validity, and generalization for the same observations. This paper provides a novel two-dimensional framework for understanding military capabilities: strength and growth. I theorize that states on similar strength levels tend to cooperate with each other, while states on similar growth levels will engage in more conflict. Furthermore, I propose a new measurement of military capability on these two dimensions using k-means clustering machine learning model and principal component analysis. Lastly, I employ logit regression to demonstrate that states in the same growth cluster are more likely to engage in conflict while states in the same strength cluster experience the opposite.
The Unfolding Character of Balancing in International Relations: The Case of Middle Powers Responding to China’s Rise (with Arthur Stein)
Abstract
This paper criticizes the conventional balance-of-power argument of a dichotomy between balancing and bandwagoning in response to adverse shifts in the balance. It delineates the assumptions underlying balancing arguments and problems associated with them. It argues that bandwagoning and balancing constitute ends of a continuum of state responses, and that each also consists of multiple possibilities. And it argues that there is a process by which rising powers manifest threat. Similarly, there is a historical unfolding process in state responses to growing threats. The paper draws on a variety of data sources to demonstrate the delayed and limited military assertiveness of China, and the range of responses by the regional powers threatened by China’s maritime claims. China’s assertiveness has both brought together the spokes in the US security structure in Asia, but has also led to hedging by those without allies.